(De)Secularization in the XXI Century: Empirical Verification of the Revitalization of Religiosity in Serbia by Radisavljević Ćiparizović, Dragana & Vuković, Ana
RELIGION
STATE
  
 
YUGOSLAV SOCIETY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 
FACULTY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ 
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
YSSSR Anuual – Year XXVI 
 
 
CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS CHANGES: 
FROM DESECULARIZATION 
TO POSTSECULARIZATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YUGOSLAV SOCIETY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 
FACULTY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ 
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
YSSSR Anuual – Year XXVI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS CHANGES:  
FROM DESECULARIZATION  
TO POSTSECULARIZATION  
 
 
_____________________ 
edited by 
DRAGAN TODOROVIĆ 
MIRKO BLAGOJEVIĆ 
DRAGOLJUB B. ĐORĐEVIĆ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YUGOSLAV SOCIETY FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 
FACULTY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ 
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 
Niš and Belgrade  
2020 
 
Contemporary Religious Changes:  
From Desecularization to Postsecularization 
 
YSSSR Anuual – Year XXVI 
XXVI Annual International YSSSR Conference 
Processes, Trends, Extents and Limits of Religious Changes in the Contemporary 
World: (De)Secularization), Postsecularization, Revitalization of Religion – 
Theoretical Underpinnings and Empirical Proof 
 
Founder 
 
Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Niš, Serbia 
 
Editors 
 
Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Niš, Serbia 
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Niš, Serbia 
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia 
 
For the Editors 
 
Dragan Todorović 
Nenad T. Pavlović 
Goran Bašić 
 
Edited by 
 
Dragan Todorović 
Mirko Blagojević 
Dragoljub B. Đorđević 
 
Reviewers 
 
Danijela Gavrilović 
Ružica Cacanoska 
Sergej Lebedev 
 
Computer Support  
and Cover Design 
 
Darko Jovanović 
 
Print 
 
SCERO print, Niš 
 
Circulation 
 
200 
 
ISBN  
 
978-86-86957-22-1 (YSSSR) 
978-86-7093-229-6 (ISS) 
 
  
Dragana Radisavljević Ćiparizović 
Faculty of Philosophy 
Belgrade, Serbia 
 
Ana Vuković 
Institute of Social Sciences  
Belgrade, Serbia 
 
(DE)SECULARIZATION IN THE XXI CENTURY: EMPIRICAL 
VERIFICATION OF THE REVITALISATION OF RELIGIOSITY IN SERBIA 
 
 
Summary 
 The purpos of this paper is a clarification of the terms and proceses of deseculari-
zation and modernity, wich are inevitable when one regards religious changes in modern pos-
tindustrial societies, as well as in postsocialist ones. Empirical reasrches confirm that even the 
most secular Western Europe does not have a homogenus religious society.  In the second part 
of the paper the autores will use key empirical research in an attempt to show revitalisation of 
religion in Serbia as well. The nineteen-nineties brought war, crisis and transition, but they 
also brought a functional change for the Serbian Ortodox Church. This paper will address so-
me of these changes: 1) religion is not just a personal thing any more, it assumes a certain pla-
ce in the public sphere; 2) a new law of religious freedom (2006) changed the legal status of 
religious communities; 3) religious centers and temples are being rebuilt and built; 4) reli-
gions have gained their place in the media (public and private), and religious radio and tv sta-
tions are also created; 5) religious communities are reciving financial suport, as well as tax 
brakes from the state, and they are gradually taking control over their property which was pre-
viously nationalised. There is also an reemergence of Religious education in Primary and Se-
condary Schools, religious service in the military and in the hospitals, so it is necessary to mo-
nitor these processes in future. 
Key words: (de)secularization, empirical reasrches, Serbian Ortodox Church, Euro-
pe, Serbia. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The challenge of modernization and secularization of religion today is being met 
by the religization of modernity (Vukomanović, 2009: 10). Religion, as an integral part 
of the globalization process, interact with different ideological, political, cultural and 
economic systems. On the other hand it  become a safe haven for “cultural defence”, 
both nationally and locally. The term Return of the Sacred, which is being brodly used 
in debates about the dominant tendencies of religius situations in (post)modern so-
cieties, was introduced to the sociology of religion by Daniel Bell in his memorial 
lecture dedicated to Hobhaouse in 1977.  
 In order to define secularization we need to reexamine the concepts of 
religion, modernity and secularization. The way we perceive secularization will de-
termin the way we understand religious revitalisation. Depending on what we imply 
by the term of secularization we can explain religious revitalization, whether secula-
rization means the differentiation between secular sphere and religious institutions, 
a decline of religious beliefs and practices or the withdrawal of religion in to the pri-
vate sphere. If we are to talk about secularization, religious revitalization and sacra-
lization we need to keep in mind the fact that religion has once again emerged in 
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those parts of the world where secularization occurred. Theoreticians all agree on one 
thing, Europe is a place of empirical verification for the theory of secularization. Non 
the less, when people report on the results of the European Values Study, they use 
the term “church-free spirituality” instead of the term secularization because Euro-
peans did not lose their “religious” needs.1 
We consider that secularization, same as it’s opposite process of deseculari-
zation, is a reversible process (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006). According to some 
authors, like Yinger (Yinger, 1970) the process of desecularization is a part of the “eter-
nal cycle of religion”, which is immanent to human nature, so the only question that 
makes sense is “in which way is someone religious?”, and not “is he religious at all?” 
Desecularization is an inevitable term when one regards religious changes in modern 
industrial and postindustrial societies, as well as in postsocialist and transitional 
societies. In her book Sociology of religion Grace Davie writes that after the predo-
mination of the established theory of secularization, todays religious revitalization 
sparks a sociological debate in an attempt to theoretically clarify what is empirically 
evidente - the presence of religion in different forms which manifests itself in the in-
dividual and social plane. That leads to new religious forms, besides old ones, which 
influences individuals, and the society itself. Luckman writes that religion in modern 
society is in no way invisible, while Davie says that secularization seams to be 
extrinsic to modernity, so you can be entirely “modern” and entirely religious. There 
are different opinions by those authors who claim that modernization inevitably 
leads to secularization. For example K. Dobblaere and B. Wilson remain fervent su-
pporters of the secularization theory stating that it stil has some explanatory value 
concerning modern social processes (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2016: 74). On the other 
hand Peter Berger, a former supporter of the secularization paradigm, feels that de-
secularization has become a permanent phenomenon (Berger, 2008:12). 
The most aperent way to disprove secularization is by use of empirical evi-
dence based on experience because since the mid ‘70s, or the late ‘80s for postco-
mmunist societies there is an increas of religious revitalization in diferent spheres of 
religious and social life. Comparative empirical data regarding religious situations in 
modern societies show with out a doubt that not only religion did not disappear, but 
it never retrited to the private sphere, and in some contemporary societies, tradition-
nal and modern, it impose itself as the main creator of public life. 
There isn't a unique stance concerning which model is the dominant one: 
“believing without belonging” (Davie 1994), or “belonging without believing” (Davie 
2005), or “neither believing nor belonging”  (Voas; Crocket, 2005). The hub of Bri-
tish sociology of religion is composed of noninstitutionalized forms of religion, new 
religious movements and New Age, religious minorities and religious organisation 
and its role in modern life (Davie, 1994). At the center of French sociology of religion 
lies an interest in new structures of religious communities, social consequence of 
religious pluralism, especially the urgent question of Islam, and the separation of re-
ligious faith from religious-institutionalized dogmas (Hervieu-Léger, 2000). We agree 
with the German sociologist Knoblauch when he states that the religious situation in 
Europe is so diverse and uneven that it can not be judged by the same standards  
(Knoblauch, 2004: xi). 
 
1 https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/about-evs/research-topics/religion/. 
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Besides the distinctions between modernity and postmodernity (Davie, 
2008: 90) theoreticians also indicate that there are differences and distinctions be-
tween different concepts of modernity. According to Eisenstadt concept of “multiple 
modernities” indicates that we cannot identify modernity with the transference of 
western models to other parts of the world (Gavrilović, 2008: 53-59). 
Theoreticians of secularization thought that the only way religious organiza-
tions can remain a part of society is if they adjust to the secularised world. Berger 
came to a different conclusion: “The fact is not only did religious communities sur-
vive, but they are flourishing in that extent in which they refused to adjust to some 
supposed demands of the secularised world” (Berger, 2008: 14). 
The results of a research done by the Pew Research Center show that people 
in West Europe believe in a Christian God the least, unlike people in Central and 
East Europe. The research involved 1400 citizens from each of these European 
countries, and religiousness was measured thru questions involving participation in 
religious ceremonies, daily prayer, belief in God, and total belief in the importance of 
religion for the individual (Politika, 17.2.2019)2. Armenia was at the top of the list 
with 79% of believers, Georgia was second with 73%, followed by Moldavia, Roma-
nia, Bosnia, Grece and Serbia in seventh place, while Croatia was in eight place (B92, 
20. 2. 2019).3 
One of the types of desecularization is an emergence of fundamentalism 
occurring as a reaction to the change brought on by modernisation. As a form of such 
deprivatization, Casanova recognizes protestant fundamentalism and Catholic reac-
tions to abortion. Also, alongside the questions of contraception and genetical engi-
neering, religion can emerge as an authority in environmental protection in modern 
societies.       
 
DESECULARIZATION IN SERBIA 
 
During the nineties people from former socialist countries started to turn 
towards religion, because of the collapse of socialism which left an ideological vacuum. 
The collapse of communism led to significant religious changes, and also led to 
changes in religious situations in almost every East European, and Middle European 
country. And while one social, cultural and symbolic system was nearing its end, 
another which was marginalised for a long time has been given a chance for (re)affir-
mation. Desecularization at first spread among the Catholic population during the 
’70s, but later during the end of the ’80s and early ’90s, it spread to the homogene-
ous Orthodox population, a population which was a full decade behind in deseculari-
zation, as they were more prone to secularization. 
Complex causes of mass conversion to atheism of the traditional Orthodox 
population, and the complete marginalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (refe-
rred below as SOC) had a deeper historical background. According to historian Rad-
mila Radić, SOC was unable to conduct an inner reform during the XIX and XX cen-
tury and become an initiator of modernization processes in Serbia, due to internal 
and external circumstances. Namely, SOC emerged from World War 2 as depleted, 
 
2 “Belief in God“ http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/422931/Vera-sa-sumnjom-u-Boga 
3 “West filed with non-believers: Serbs in 7. Place just above their neighbours.” 
https://www.b92.net/zivot/vesti.php?yyyy=2019&mm=02&dd=20&nav_id=1507663. 
 
CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS CHANGES… 
24 
 
robed, with its priesthood decimated, and without any material bases, or real income 
due to the agrarian reform, so it was depended on the government aid. “Modus Vi-
vendi between the church and the state was to be achieved through peaceful means, 
according to state authorities, meaning that the church had to abandon its mission 
willingly, and withdraw from the public sphere... Total control over the organization 
of the SOC was achieved in a little less than five years after the war” (Radić, 1994: 
352). The so called ''inner weakness of orthodoxy'' was considered the main reason 
of opposition towards secularization, especially compared to Catholicism an Isalm, 
and they entailed the following: 1) traditional roles of SOC in the definition of the 
Serbian national subject and its symbolic connections to the state, 2) decentralized 
nature of institutionalized orthodoxy, and the lack of a sole administrative center, 
which would give it support in the fight against social marginalization, do with the new 
and unfavorable situation. For example, Vatikan always provided strong support for 
the Catholic church in Croatia and Slovenia, 3) Fideism as reliance on faith rather 
than reason in pursuit of religious truth, and the neglect of social problems. 4) a long 
time schism in the Church, while it was in emigration.4 The results of such forced 
secularization are best demonstrated by Đorđevic's empirical research of the district 
of Niš, done in 1984 where the percentage of religious practices, celebrations and 
dogmatic beliefs have reached its all time minimum, ranging from 0,16% to 10,32% 
of cases (cited according to Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006: 35-36). 
Religious revitalization in this part is certainly part of a large-scale social process 
which is implemented in the entire world, and especially in central and southeast 
Europe, but it is also an autonomous process which has its special characteristics. 
The results obtained in our study “Religiosity and Tradition” confirm the basic hy-
pothesis of a revival of attachment to religion and the church in Serbia in late 1990s, 
manifested in decade's continuity of high traditional religiosity, but above all thro-
ugh the growth – not spectacular, but evident – of the so-called current religiosity. Be-
yond any doubt, the image of the so-called typical believer at the end of the last decade of 
the 20th century is completely changed in comparison with the mode of believers of the 
1980s. Thanks to an increase in religiosity of, primarly, urban population, men, highly 
educated, and the young, previous differences in attachment to religion and thechurch by 
place of residence, gender, education and profession have been leveled significantly. In 
changed social circumstances the credibility of SOC, as the most influential church in 
Serbian society, has grown (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006: 165-166). 
The Serbian Orthodox Church has emerged from a half century of exile into the 
public sphere, and became once again a significant factor in the reshaping of religi-
ous and national identity. After the regime change during the 5 October 2000 SOC 
not only retained its social position, as the largest church in Serbia, but strengthened  
it significantly. What was abolished through political actions, and through imposing 
communist ideology, emerged in a similar, but less violent way. In the July of 2001 
in Primary and Secondary Schools was introduset Religious Education as a type of 
confesional class (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006: 95-105). 
 
4 After twenty nine years, during the celebration of Candlemas (on the February 15. 1992) the 
schism in the Serbian Orthodox Church was ended when His Holiness, the Serbian Patriarch 
Paul led a procession in St. Michael's Cathedral alongside Metropolitan Bishop Irinej 
(https://www.saborna-crkva.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=395&Itemid=301). 
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Then Faculty of Orthodox Theology was reintroduced to the Belgrade Uni-
versity, and priests were reintroduced to the military. After six different versions the 
law that defines the position of religious communities was finally passed. Nationa-
lised church property is either retrund or reimbursed, and temples are either being 
built or rebuilt. Media presence of priests at public manifestations, or political elites 
at religious events has been noticed.  
Here are some examples from the local press and internet: 
Building and rebilding of churches and monesteries 
 “Since the nineties Serbian Orthodox Church has rebuilt about 500 of its 
churches and monasteries. Despite the economic crisis church construction in the 
last decades is going thru an renaissance in every country where SOC has its diocese 
- Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Germany, America. In Serbia alone 
in the last fifteen years there have been over 200 new temples built, and builders are 
finishing about a hundred more”  (Novosti, 2011).5 
Priests in hospitals  
 “Within an emerging number of hospitals in Belgrade special chapels have 
bean opened in which patients can pray, confess, take communion and get baptized. 
First such chapel was opened in Special hospital for cerebrovascular diseases "Saint 
Sava" two decades ago, and in other medical institutions after that. Today there's ba-
rely a hospital without a place for worship. Priest receive lists with patients names 
and mentions them in daily prayer” (Danas, 28.4.2008.)6   
Military priest reintroduced to the service 
 “After more then seven decades Serbian military will be assigned military 
priests – eight ortodox ones, and one imam, and one Chatolic chaplain. Ceremony 
was atended by Metropolitan bishop Porfirije, and Archbishop Stanislav Hočevar… 
Military priests-officers don't carry any weapons, nor will they be able to comand” 
(Novosti, 31. 7. 2013.)7 
Liturgy in District Prison  
“On the second day of the Christmas, on the feast-day of the Assembly of 
the Most Holy Mother of God, with the service of the Holy Liturgy in the chapel of 
the Resurrection of Christ in the District Prison in Belgrade. There were present at 
the service: prisoners of that prison, commanders and employees of the facility, pari-
shioners of the Vozdovac church of Holy Emperor Constantine and Helen, members 
of the Charity section of the Archbishopric of Belgrade-Karlovci, deacon Branislav 
Jocic and prison chaplain Revd. Gligorije Markovic” (January 2019. Website of 
SOC).8  
 
 
 
 
 
5 „Prayer among scaffolding“ 
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.290.html:352108-Molitvamedju-skelama 
6 „Prair in hospitals“ https://www.danas.rs/beograd/molitva-u-bolnicama/ 
7 „Serbian military: military priests in service again“ 
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:446764-Vojska-Srbije-
Vojni-svestenici-ponovo-u-sluzbi. 
8 “Christmas in the Central prison in Belgrade“ 
http://spc.rs/sr/bozhitsh_u_centralnom_zatvoru_u_beogradu. 
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REVITALIZATION OF RELIGIOUSNES IN SERBIA:  
ARGUMENTS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 There are two theorical frameworks when it comes to interpreting religious 
revitalization in Serbia. First adreses religion as a public institution, while the second 
entitles individual needs of belivers for religion and spirituality. While the first fra-
mework is unquestioned, the second one brings about different, often colliding 
opinions, and different interpretations of the same empirical evidences made by the 
leading Serbian sociologists of religion. Dragoljub B. Đorđević takes in to acount 
indicators of traditional relations towards religion and the church which show that 
this type of relations is the most widespread (Đorđević, 2009: 57-64). On the other 
hand, Mirko Blagojević takes in to acount recent religious behaviour, and uses this 
recent behaviour to prove the changes made in the initialization of religiousness of 
the population. Being that the case of Serbia isn't the sole case in Europe, we should 
take into acount different religious situations in different countries. More then half 
of the people interviewed go to church at least once a month in catholic countries, up 
to one quarter in confessional mixed countries, in protestant countries a small 
number of people practice this religious obligation, and the same goes for modern 
Orthodox Russia. Religious practices and belief in God in Serbia are closer to Catho-
lic countries (Italy and Portugal), and is significally higher not only compared to pro-
testant (Denmark and Sweden) and confessional mixed countries (Great Britain and 
Holland), but also higher compared to Orthodox Russia. However, when it comes to 
regular participation in religious ceremonies of the interviewed believers, then the 
difference between catholic, protestant, confessionaly mixed and orthodox countries 
is being clearly noticed. Situation in Serbia is then closer to confessionaly mixed 
countries. The structure of believers which was formed during the nineties in Serbia 
remained intact, it has even grown stronger regarding religious consciousness, and 
advanced by “crabs walk” in the ritual dimension (Blagojević, 2008: 255). 
 
Religiousness in Serbia in the XXI Century:  
Results of a Sociological Study 
In order to detect any change in religiousness of Serbian citizens in the 21st 
century we compared results from two sociological studies which refer to: a) con-
fessional and religious self identification of believers, b) traditional and c) current 
religiousness. On the one hand, considering the fact that both researches were done 
on a representative sample increases their comparisons, but on the other we are aware of 
certain limitation in the comparison because the 1999 research was done on a dozen 
selected indicators. According to the 2010 Research, 93% of the interviewed people 
declared that they belong to a confession, which is identical to the 1999 research – 
93,5%. 77% of these were orthodox, catholics 8,6, evangelists or some other prote-
stant church 0,8, Muslims 6,2, buddhists 0,2 while those who don’t belong to a reli-
gious community are at 6,6 (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2011: 25-42).  
Religious selfidentification is also a part of the so called low indicators of 
religiousness, but they are the most frequently used ones. in the 1999 research 60% 
were religious, a fifth was undecided (21%) and nonreligious les then a fifth (19%). 
Our expectations were that the undecided, who are usually a group influenced by 
different socio-cultural relations, as well as personal dispositions and socialisation 
(learning of religious behavior) will align themselves across the believer-nonbeliever 
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halfs. And that’s exactly what happened, because according to the 2010 research the 
number of religious people jumped to 78%, but the number of undecided dropped by 
five times (4%) compared to 1999 while the number of nonreligious dropped insigni-
ficantly to 14%. 
 
Table 1. What is your relation towards religion? Are you personally religious?(in %) 
 
Modality 1. 1999 2. 2010 
Religious 59 78 
Undecided and indifferent 21 4 
Not religious 19 14 
 
1. Religion and tradition (Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš) 1999. (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2006); 
2. Religiousness  in Serbia 2010. (HKC, 2011). 
 
Traditional Attachment to Church and Religion 
 We monitor traditional religiousness thru these indicators: baptism of chil-
dren, the celebration of religious holidays and church burials. Besides confessional 
religiousness, the traditional religiousness not only remained on the same level, but 
we observed a slight increase. 
 
Table2. Traditional links with the church and religion in % 
 
Indicators 1. 1999 2. 2010 
Baptism of children 84 87 
Celebration of religious holidays 87 92 
Church burials 86 87 
 
1. Religion and tradition (Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš) 1999. (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2006); 
2. Religiousness  in Serbia 2010. (HKC, 2011). 
 
Current Attachment to Church and Religion 
Indicators that show current attachment to church are: participation in the 
Liturgy, going to Church and temple, regular prayer, fast, confession, holly commu-
nion. There are about 10% of religious church goers. These percentages are expecte-
dly smaller, but there is a significant rise in every indicator (regular particpation in 
Liturgy almost 10%, 4,1% go to church more than once a week, while 8,7% go to chu-
rch more than once a week- which means that 13% of people interviewed go to their 
temples once a week. Every day prayer and regular fasting are almost doubled). 
 
Table 3. Elements of religious behaviour and the congregation 
 
Indicators 1. 1999 2. 2010 
Liturgy-almost every time 2,1 9,8 
Going to church at least once a week - 12,8 
Everyday prayer 15,9 27,4 
Regular fasting 16,8 27,4 
 
1. Religion and tradition (Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš) 1999. (Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2006); 
2. Religiousness  in Serbia 2010. (HKC, 2011). 
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Based on these data, we can say that the religious revitalization, and the 
image of believers has changed the most in the period between the ‘80s and the end 
of the ‘90s. The decade that we observed (1999-2010) only verifies those trends. 
Results of Pew Research Center: As much as 87% of people in Serbia believe 
in God, that is to say 58% is certain in his existence, and 29% aren’t. Only 10% of the 
nation are atheists. Countries in which the majority doesn't believe in God include 
Czech republic (66%), Sweden (60%), Belgium (54%) and Holand with 53% of non-
believers (B92, 20.2.2019). 
 
Table 4. Religious profile of the region (number of people interviewed in procentages)     
                            
 Romania Grece BIH Croatia Serbia 
Religion is very important in their 
lives 
50 55 54 42 34 
Attend religious services at least 
once a month 
50 38 35 40 19 
Pray every day 44 29 32 40 27 
Believe in God with certainty 64 59 66 57 58 
  Source: Pew Research Center 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
(De)secularization is an  inevitable term when one regards religious changes 
in modern industrial and postindustrial societies, as well as in postsocialist and tran-
sitional societies. Comparative empirical data regarding religious situations in mo-
dern societies show without a doubt that not only religion did not disappear, but it 
never retired to the private sphere, and in some contemporary societies, traditional 
and modern, it impose itself as the main creator of public life. 
Europe is a place of empirical verification for the theory of secularization, 
but things aren't in unison as they seem. This is why we cannot generalize because 
there are differences between catholic, protestant and orthodox population, between 
Great Britain and northern European countries. In (post)modern societies secular 
ideas and values exist side by side with religious values which points to a certain 
value relativism, that is to say existence at the same time of value orientations which 
seem to be at different theoretical positions (Radisavljević Ćiparizović, 2006). 
Religious revitalization in the XXI century has been just a continuation of a 
trend that started during the time of crisis, wars and transition in the nineteen 
nineties. At that time desecularization occurred which lead to the change in the role 
of religious communities in Serbia. At this time SOC started to provide a new ideo-
logical framework for different state institutions, such as military or schools, filling 
the ideological vacuum left by the fall of communism, showing initiative in doing so, 
but also with the help of the government. After 2000 this trend was confirmed. This 
paper already addressed some of these changes: 1) religion is not just a personal 
thing any more, it assumes a certain place in the public sphere; 2) a new law of reli-
gious freedom (2006) changed the legal status of religious communities; 3) religious 
centers and temples are being rebuilt and built; 4) religions have gained their place 
in the media (public and private), and religious radio and tv stations are also crea-
ted; 5) religious communities are reciving financial suport, as well as tax reliefs from 
the state, and they are gradually taking control over their property which was 
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previously nationalised; 6) an reemergence of Religious education in Primary and 
Secondary Schools, religious service in the military and in the hospitals. Even though 
there are different interpretations of the same empirical evidence, we feel that the 
result of empirical studies (both domestic and foreign) speaks for the process of 
desecularization in Serbia. 
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